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THE CYBERNETIC SELF AND ITS DISCONTENTS: CARE 
AND SELF-CARE IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY
BORIS TRAUE
Contemporary  Western  societies  are  characterized  by  the  spreading  of 
practices of self-care. This can be observed in a number of developments: 
a heightened attention to the body in everyday life and consumption, the 
rise of  practices  designed to improve oneself,  the ongoing privatisation 
and individualisation of lives in affluent societies, an increasing range of 
institutions and industries occupied with the production of health products, 
advice and guidance. Taking care of oneself in an intensified manner — as 
a cultural pattern —has been associated with a radicalised individualism in 
the sense of a “narcissistic preoccupation with the self”, as Christopher  
Lasch proposes  in  his  at  the  time instantly  famous  1979 study (Lasch 
1979:  21).  In  the  tradition  of  a  psychoanalytically  inspired  cultural 
criticism  (Fromm  1956,  Marcuse  1964),  to  which  Lasch  refers,  even 
though  he  is  not  part  of  the  Frankfurt  tradition,  vitriolic  criticism  is 
directed against a perceived loss of a collectivistic political subject caused 
by consumerism and the loss of historical consciousness: "To live for the 
moment  is  the  prevailing  passion — to live  for  yourself,  not  for  your 
predecessors or posterity." (Lasch 1979: 5). Lasch attributes this loss of 
past  and  future  mainly to  the hedonistic  and  therapeutic  culture  of  the 
1970s, whereas Fromm and Marcuse see consumerism, cultural industry 
and technology in general as the culprit, in their capacity to provide ready-
made identities  and seemingly instantaneous satisfaction of  ready-made 
desires. “Repressive de-sublimation” is Marcuse’s widely influential term 
for a “de-erotisation” of the social world (Marcuse 93f).  Norbert  Elias 
exposes a more melancholic and at the same time mundane perspective on 
the problem of self-care.  For him,  increased  control  of  our  bodies  and 
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expressions is the price we pay for a less intense central government and 
the vastly increased interdependence of modern citizens. He is to be given 
credit  for  discovering  that  a  structurally  induced  modern  orientation 
toward one’s own behaviour gives rise to new forms of knowledge with its 
specific  objects:  “experience”  and  the  “psyche”.1 Richard  Sennett 
constructs  a  different  genealogy  of  narcissism,  albeit  with  similar 
consequences: the decline of the public sphere leads to a decline of the 
playfulness of social interaction and in consequence to a “psychologisation 
of  structures  of  domination”  rooted  in  the  sentiment  of  the narcissistic 
character (Sennett 1974: 423, 421). 
At a second glance, these diagnoses offer quite contradictory account of 
(post)modern  individualism.  Even Lasch,  perhaps  the  most  unrelenting 
critic  of  narcisissm,  concedes  that  anti-institutional  distrust  of  those  in 
power  “may  furnish  the  basis  of  a  new  capacity  for  self-government, 
which  would  end  by  doing  away  with  the  need  that  gives  rise  to  a 
governing class in the first place” (Lasch 1979: 20). This contradiction in 
diagnosis and thus prognosis will not be resolved in the line of discussion 
which reaches from the early Frankfurt school to the American studies of 
character. 
The  intuition  to  be  pursued  in  the  following  is  that  this  contradiction 
remains  unresolved  because  not  enough attention  has  been  paid to  the 
means and media by which the relations to oneself and to the other are 
organised, or more precisely: the conditions for serialities and singularities 
of  self-care.  Every  self-relation  is  serial,  part  of  a  long  series  of 
institutionalised knowledge based practices,  but  it  can also be  singular,  
when  it  is  an  innovative  act  breaking  up  the  patterns  of  consumption, 
exchange, and hierarchy. 
1 He describes this formation of  categories  of  the ‚human sciences’ in  the last  
chapter  of  the ‚civilizing  process’:  „Like  conduct  generally,  the perception of 
things  and  people  also  becomes  affectively  more  neutral  in  the  course  of  the 
civilizing  process.  The  “world  picture”  gradually  becomes  less  determined  by 
human wishes and fears and more strongly orientated to what we call “experience” 
or “the empirical’, to sequences with their own immanent regularities. […] It was 
particularly  in  the  circles  of  court  life  that  what  we  would  today  call  a  
“psychological” human self-image developed, a more precise observation of others 
and oneself in terms of longer series of motives and causal connections, because it 
was there that vigilant self-control and perpetual observation of others were among 
the elementary prerequisites for the preservation of one’s social position” (Elias 
2000: 400).
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By means or media I do not only refer to the media of communication and 
exchange which give structure to the circulation of discourses, identities, 
and affects, but also to the means and media of writing about narcissism 
and self-care. Subjectivity cannot be theorized in an objectifying manner, 
from the position of a detached observer, precisely because this stance of 
the observer is  part  of  the problem which the literature  on postmodern 
disidentification, desubjectivation and narcissism is seeking to adress. 
More  recent  analyses  of  subjectivation  have  taken  into  account  the 
technological  conditions  of  subjectivation:  Bernard  Stiegler  directs 
attention  to  the  technological  formation  of  ‘attention’,  which  becomes 
“reduced  to  the  automatic  operating  of  tertiary  retentions  [Stiegler’s 
terminology for image-consciousness]”, by which primary and secondary 
retentions,  i.e.  the  functioning of  individual  and  historical  memory  are 
“eliminated”,  thereby disturbing  or  even  obliterating  the long cycles of 
sublimation   (Stiegler  2008:  163).  In  a  similar  vein,  the  Austrian 
psychoanalyst  and  media  theorist  Robert  Pfaller  question  the  popular 
assumption of the ‘interactivity’ of the new media and a corresponding 
‘activation’ of the subject. He in turn claims that contemporary culture is 
better  characterised by a  delegation  of pleasure and an ensuing loss of 
playfulness which is escalated by the new media. He calls this condition 
“interpassivity”  (Pfaller  2002:  36ff):  “The  method  of  interpassivity 
consists thus in the supplementation of certain actions by others and in the 
execution of ersatz actions. This is what constitutes the relation between 
an absent interpassive person and his solitarily humming videorecorder: 
The recorder watches tv for the absent person, because he has programmed 
it (or instructed somebody to do so)” (Pfaller 2002: 37, my translation). 
Taking these cues, my hypothesis is that an analysis of the conditions and 
consequences of self-care as a practice and mode of socialisation requires 
a consideration of the materiality and mediality of the practices we seek to 
describe  and  assess,  in  order  to  gain  an  analytic  distinction  between 
different forms of self-care, and the degree to which they are — or are at 
least susceptible to — mechanisms of control. Digital media enhance self-
care, and at the same time, they can destroy it. I will end by claiming that  
self-care is an impossible possibility. In a scoiological perspective, the task 
would be to describe the social and technological conditions which enable 
modes of non-narcissistic and non-toxic self-care.
I will proceed  in three steps:
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Firstly,  I  will  expose  some  of  the  difficulties  in  interpretating 
contemporary regimes of subjectivation in regard to labour. 
Secondly  ,  the  inquiry  into  self-care  as  a  contemporary  mode  of 
subjectivation  and  social  will  be  exposed  by  interpreting  Michel 
Foucault’s analysis of self-care in antiquity on the background of Derrida’s 
notion of event. 
Thirdly,  self-care  as  a  practice  of  truth-telling  will  be  related  then  to 
contemporary media regimes and their modes of control.
Finally,  I  will  draw  some  conclusions  regarding  the  conditions  for  a 
possible realisation of self-care as a care of the other.
Subjectivation and the care of the self
The German debate on the ‘subjectivation of labour’ has shed light on an 
implicit  paradox  of  contemporary  subjectivity.  The  ‘subjectivation’ of 
labour, understood in everyday practices as an erasure of the boundaries 
between   ‘life’ and  work,  has  been  diagnosed  on  the  one  hand  as  a 
‘normative  subjectivation’  (Baethge  1991),  a  demand  articulated  by 
individuals in a kind of defense of or claim to subjectivity. But it is on the 
other  hand  also an  organisational  and  economic  demand,  aiming at  an 
intensification  and escalation  of the relation between labour and ‘life’ in 
order  to  valorise  creativity  and  affect,  leaving  workers  vulnerable  to  a 
‘deepened’ commodification of their labour. 
This paradox of internalization of labour conflict has been articulated in 
the  German  debate  theoretically  in  the  figure  of  the 
“Arbeitskraftunternehmer”,  i.e.  the  “entreployee”  (Voß  and  Pongratz 
1998). In the process of the subjectivation of labor, life itself becomes the 
object of valuation, not left within the less-regulated domain of use-value, 
but injected into the domain of circulation by treating it as exchange value. 
This becoming-knowledge and becoming-object of life itself in the labour 
process  upsets  traditional  dichotomies  and  boundaries:  production 
becomes  a  form  of  consumption,  whereas  consumption  can  become 
labourious;  life  becomes  labour-intensive,  as  Arlie  Hochschild  has 
demonstrated (Hochschild 1997). This paradox given by the liberation of 
labour from the fordist disciplinary context and its self-disciplining or self-
controlling effects have not been resolved in the ‘subjectivation of labour’ 
debate;  one  path  chosen  to  process  the  paradox and  to  understand  the 
‘labours’,  or  the  grievances,  of  the  subjectified  labourer  is  a  socio-
structural analysis: in higher social strata, the promise of subjectivation is 
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more fullfilled than in other, lower strata. Such analyses effectively reveal 
the ideological  character of the activating labor market policies without 
adressing the question whether new political subjects or even collectivities 
or can arise  from subjectified labor processes.  The enterprising self,  as 
analyzed by Nikolas Rose (1998), Andrea Bührmann (2004) and Ulrich 
Bröckling (2007) is not believed to be inclined of developing a political 
subjectivity capable of collectivising their interests. The discussion on the 
care of the self literally goes one step back, historically and theoretically. 
Self-care is not a widely used terminus technicus in the social and cultural 
sciences. It is nevertheless a concept which has been made relevant in a 
number of academic discussions at different times — it is at least a subtext 
in  discussions  of  intersubjectivity  and  intentionality,  and,  on  a  more 
general  empirical  level,  individualism  and  individuation.  There  are  of 
course ‘classical’ deployments of the terminology. Martin Heidegger has 
given it a prominent place in the philosophy of ‘Being and Time’, where it 
is closely linked to temporality and gives a name to the certainty of death, 
but  the  in-certainty  of  its  arrival.  Feminist  philosopher  Carol  Gilligan 
gives the term an ethical and intersubjective turn. She used the concept of 
care in the intention of a critique of the concept of morality and especially 
Kohlberg’s rationalist concept of moral stages. For her, care is a more apt 
concept  for  moral  philosophy  since  it  underscores  the  dependence  on 
others in the making of moral judgements preceeded by actions of care.
Michel Foucault is of course an author who has revitalized the concept. 
The ‘ethical  phase’ of  his work is amongst  other  issues  dedicated  to  a 
genealogical understanding of antique practices and philosophies of ‘cura 
sui’ and situating them in relation to christian, and thereby more or less  
contemporary practices of the self. While Volumes two and three of the 
“history of sexuality” and the lectures on the “hermeneutic  of self” are 
devoted to fleshing out the differences and continuities between heathen 
and monotheistic practices of self-care, Foucault’s recently published last 
two lectures (Foucault 2009) exhibit a different concern though, and it will 
be the one I want to follow: in relating self-care to  parrhesia — truth-
speaking — it is not so much the overtly political aspects of parrhesia that 
are in the foreground, but the relation self-care to knowledge itself as a 
regulation  of  knowing.  My assumption,  which  I  will  elaborate,  is  that 
Foucault  foregrounds  self-care  as  an  event.  Self-care  is  personal, 
intersubjective,  and  singular.  It  is  constantly  under  threat  of  being 
subsumed  under  pedagogic,  scientific  or  religious  discoursive  practices 
obscuring its potentialities for the creation of civic culture. 
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Self-care,  understood  as  a  relation  of  the  person  to  the  person,  and  a 
knowing  of oneself, has a foundation in the body. The most elementary 
form  of  self-care,  can  be  argued,  is  the  body  touching  itself.  These 
affectations occur in everyday life: The body touching itself is more than 
just a movement and less than a gesture. It is, in a way, a gesture directed 
toward oneself, which does not “communicate” but affects directly: The 
hand touching the face and the neck, the massaging of an aching stomach, 
the stroking of  cold arms,  the play of  the  fingers  with themselves,  the 
shuffling of restless feet.  These affections follow the temporality of the 
body: a churning stomach, a sudden swindle or drowsiness, the sweat on 
one’s eyebrowes, the self-embrace in loneliness. These affectations can be 
passing  and  arbitrary  or  following  a  great  need.  Some  of  them  are 
comforting,  when  resting  one’s  head  in  one’s  arms,  but  they  can  also 
propel  us  into  action.  Psychoanalysis  teaches  us  that  even  these  very 
private gestures are recollections and recuperations of motherly, fatherly 
caresses and embraces and are thus of an interpersonal and social origin. 
So there are always touches and gestures preceding the self-touches and 
self-gestures. And these affectation can be given to another, to help a child 
or a friend, or a nervous speaker to calm their nerves, to help them cross a 
barrier or boundary. Self-care in its most elemental form, ‘taught’ to us by 
others, which enables us to pass it on. It helps cross boundaries and helps 
in transcending helplessness.  It  can have  a quality of guidance;  having 
been  taught  what  to  do  and  how  to  cope  with  fear,  loneliness, 
embarrassment, awkwardness, but also how to ‘feel’ satisfaction, self-love 
and pride.2 This bodily grounding of self-care makes apparent that it  is 
always  a  trace  of  the  real or  presymbolic,  even  though  we  can  only 
experience it in its imaginary, e.g. helpful or threatening  quality. The urge 
to reflect on self-care inevitable situates these practices in the  symbolic  
order, situating them in discursive strategies. This Lacanian analytic shall 
not be followed any further here, but it should be kept in mind that an 
understanding of self-care and care of others as an event, that, even though 
it occurs frequently in everyday life, bears a trace of the real disturbing the 
symbolic  ordering  of  the  so-called  life-world  in  its  ontological 
conventionality. 
2 These  self-gestures  can  be  read  in  public  spaces  as  signs  of  uneasyness,  
embarassment or assertiveness and relaxation. 
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While these elementary, non-discursive forms of self-care3 should be kept 
in  mind,  the  practices  we  will  turn  to  in  the  following  have  a  more 
discursive  format.  The  practices  and  programmatics  of  self-guidance 
which  were  developed  in  the  context  of  christian  practices  of  self-
questioning,  indicate,  for  Foucault,  documents  of  an  obscurance  of  the 
possibility of a non-instrumental intersubjectivity and relation to oneself 
which is not regulated by a hegemonic scripture. The cura sui of Roman 
antiquity, to briefly mention Foucault’s well-known analyses, is a form of 
knowledge of oneself  (2004: 93ff),  which extends toward the whole of 
one’s life (Foucault 2004: 111 ff) and thus requires a ‘role model’ of sorts 
as a “master of subjectivation” (Foucault 2004: 171f). It  is practised in 
order  to  enable  oneself  to  care for  others  — and thereby to become a 
political  subject  (224).  Foucault  suggests  that  in  the  “culture  de  soi” 
(2004:  216  ff.)  of  antiquity,  non-instrumental  intersubjectivities  and 
practices concerned with the self were common, at least in certain social 
groups,  namely  in  the  philosophically  inclined  upper  strata.  In  these 
practices,  a  construction  of  the  self  as  an  object  of  knowledge  and  an 
installation  of  the  self  as  the  ends  of  the  practises  arising  from  this 
knowledge:  “In  the  practise  called  the  care  of  the  self,  we  find  a 
absolutisation — excuse the word — of the self as an object of care as 
well  as as an assertion of the self as an end” (Foucault 2004: 226, my 
translation).
Self-care and truth
To  explain  this  semantic  and  practical  structure,  Foucault  develops  a 
complex argument in regard to the relation of writing to events of self-care 
and care of the other. The complication of his argument is encapsulated in 
the ambiguity of  language as difference,  which at  once  constitutes  and 
obscures experience. The discussion of self-care, thus, could be directed 
directly  towards  an  interrogation  of  the  theoretical  and  methodological 
meaning of the “experientiality” of self-care, as a method or medium of 
gaining access to shared meanings within intersubjective social relations.4 
I  will  instead take a detour via  the  event-character  of  self-care and its 
3 Non-discursive  not  in  the  absolute  sense  of  resisting  interpretation,  but  as 
preceding interpretation and symbolisation, even though psychoanalysis teaches us 
that every gesture  is always already embedded in the symbolic,  albeit  often ‘a  
posteriori’.
4 We find in Foucaults late writing an often implicit discussion of experientiality,  
leading him back to early themes in his work (Unterthurner 2007).
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possible symbolizations, my argument being that the other and his acts of 
care can not be represented in its specificity – ‘Besonderheit’  – if self-care 
is not unanticipated, and thus able to interrupt the chains of signification 
constituting experience (Erfahrung). There are a number of vocabularies 
for expressing the interruption of the smoothness of conventional mundane 
experience pre-fabricated by the cultural industries and technologies, and 
with the discussion of self-care in its relation to truth as a qualification of 
knowledge, I want to further explore one of these vocabularies.
In  the  following,  I  claim  that  Foucault,  in  his  interpretation  of  ethical 
practices in antiquity,5 implicates that self care is an event,  not a routine. 
Self-care  is  not  a  solipsistic  or  narcissistic,  but  an  intersubjective  and 
collective, and finally, at its limits, political practice. Whereas the care of 
the self has the reference to oneself as its object, it is enabled by one-sided 
or mutual criticism: the other is critisised for entertaining illusions about 
himself or herself, for not living up to his or her ethical claims. Self-care  
thus interrupts habits or beliefs entertained about oneself – this is why an 
act of caring for the self in the sense of creating knowledge of oneself by 
allowing the intervention of another, a friend or a spiritual teacher, is an 
event in the sense of an interruption of habit and institutionally legitimated 
action.  Things might not be as they were before after a person is told a  
truth about oneself which he/she recognizes as the truth.  It is precisely in 
this sense that self-care is closely related to ‘parrhesia’, truth-telling:  “We 
have thus, if I may say so, a whole structure, a whole package of important 
terms  or  themes:  Care  of  the  self,  knowledge  of  oneself,  the  art  and 
practise of oneself, relation to the other, being governed by the other and 
truth-speaking,  obligation of  telling the truth on the side of  this  other” 
(Foucault 2008: 44).  Self-care requires the parrhesia, the truth-speaking 
of another: This is risky business, especially when the other person is more 
powerful than oneself:  “I think we have here a scene which is in a way 
exemplary of parrhesia: A man stands upright in the face of a tyrant and 
tells him the truth” (Foucault 2008: 49). 
Via  parrhesia,  self-care  is  endowed  with  a  political  dimension.  This 
willingness to  lose control  and to endanger oneself, to trust,   even with 
5 Foucault  would  like  us  to  understand  his  analyses  as  a  pre-history  to  
contemporary practices of self-care: „The study of parrhesia and of parrhesiastes in 
the culture of oneself in antiquity is evidently a kind of prehistory of the practices 
which are organised and developed afterwards around certain celebrated couples:  
the  sinner  and  his  confessor,  the  directed  and  the  director  of  conscience,  the 
mentally  ill  and  the  psychiatrist,  the  patient  and  the  psychoanalyst.  It  is  this 
prehistory, in a sense, that I have tried“ (Foucault 2009: 9, my translation) 
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negative outcomes for the one telling his or her truth is part of the notion 
of parrhesia. This, according to Foucault’s analysis, has to do with the fact 
that  the  notion  of  parrhesia  has  its  roots  in  political  practice  and  the 
problematisation of democracy, and has only later been “derived” into the 
“sphere  of  personal  ethics”  and the “constitution  of  the  moral  subject” 
(Foucault  2009: 10).  Parrhesia is,  then,  the intersubjective and political 
aspect of self-care and self-knowledge. His writing on self-care restores, in 
a certain sense, the political and therefore6 ‘eventive’ notion of self-care. 
Truth-telling as a way of constituting knowledge is not only an experience 
between two people; a ‘third’ is often present. This can be an observer or 
oneself  recording  what  has  happened  and  preserve  it  ‘for’ others  and 
posterity. Without this third, who knows how to record and conserve an 
event, the event ‘is’ not, cannot be referred to, cannot be located in space 
and  time,  cannot  become  part  of  a  tradition.  But  the  possibility  of 
conserving  the  event  by  writing  about  it  is  at  the  same  time  an 
impossibility: writing is always writing within a pre-established system of 
differences, which threaten to obliterate the difference made by the event, 
the trace of the real: Foucault extracts from the descriptions of parrhesia 
four negative definitions: Parrhesia is not to be conflated with education, 
neither is it part of rhetoric’s, even though ‘frankly saying something’ can 
be a simple rhetorical device (Foucault 2008: 51ff). And it is also not a 
prophetical veridiction, “because the prophet is in a position of mediation. 
The  prophet,  by  definition,  does  not  speak  in  his  own  proper  name” 
(Foucault  2009:  16).  The  wise  person  (le  sage)  is  typically  not  a 
parrhesiast, because he does not speak of issues truly concerning others. 
Theses  distinctions  are  not  only  nominalistic  problems or  problems  of 
definition; they point to the aforementioned issue, which is the question of 
writing  the  event  in  the  empirical  languages  and  language-games  that 
society provides. The ex negativo definitions of what parrhesia and self-
care are (not) refers to the question of how the parrhesiastic events of self-
care  are  being  written  down,  conserved,  and  objectified  (in  a  certain 
sense):  Not  as  pedagogy,  not  as  knowledge,  not  as  prophecy,  not  as 
science. Conventionalised, functionalised, in short: objectified discourses 
do not provide a language for the events of intersubjective self-care which 
could give expression to their ‘transcendence’ of economic, pedagogical 
and  scientific  problems.7 To  recast  the  problem  in  phenomenological 
6 Insofar as the political and the event are closely interrelated, following Maurice  
Blanchot (2007). 
7 This position is in no way to doubt the necessity of functionalised communication 
in law. bureaucracy, economics etc. 
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terminology: How can the other of self-care  not  act in the anonymity of 
being a representative of reason, calculus, the law etc.  and  still act as a 
public  person  not  entirely  retreated  into  the  absolute  subjectivity  of  a 
privatized horizon? The problem is not the absence of indvidual sense, but 
the  programmatic  character  of  all  difference  ‘normally’ allowed within 
normalizing and standardising discourses. Self-care is, insofar as it is an 
event,  a  regularly  reoccuring  exception,  following  Derrida’s  cue,  an 
‘impossible  possibility’ (Derrida  2007)  as  is  the  event  in  general.  For 
Derrida,  the  event  is  something  not  anticipated,  and  not  planned,  even 
though it can be hoped for. He finds in the gift a model or metaphor for the 
event. The gift loses its quality of being such when a reciprocal gift is 
expected. The gift then becomes a merely uncompleted act of exchange 
within the established and economic social conventions of exchange. The 
same holds true for self-care,  if it  is conceptualized as an event, which 
cannot be planned, but which can be enabled by societies, and which they 
ultimately rely on. The care for oneself and the other continually renews 
individual and collective powers of sustaining the exchange process, this 
being a kind of reproductive function, and inventing futures, this being a 
creative function. 
 
Foucault, in his analysis, is concerned with care and self-care, both ways 
of  truth-telling,  as  being  caught  up  in  the  totalizing  movements  of 
monotheistic control of signification and conduct. Self-care is impossible 
in a certain sense,  as it  is  dependent on a symbolization,  which, at  the 
historical  point  in  time  of  the  establishment  of  literacy,  had  already 
obscured its possibilities, insofar as the  what  of the written is subsumed 
under programmatic discourses of education, prophecy, and science. At the 
same time, the event of self-care has to be written as to be intelligible and 
repeatable, in other words: it needs to be redoubled in writing, to step into 
social being, to be repeatable and teachable. This is the paradox to which 
Foucault alerts us, a paradox which has to be specified for each epoch of 
historical and technological development. 
It is necessary thus to find a way of writing care and self-care in order for  
it to become a sustainable form of tradition, which is of course the whole 
point  of theorizing self-care as a practice grounded in certain forms of 
knowledge. An element of conventionality, of  control,  is inevitable — at 
least  in a sociological  perspective.  How does control  co-constitute self-
care? How and when does it endanger self-care? 
10
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Control and Writing
The care of the self, for Foucault, is opposed to or at least endangered by 
textual technologies of  writing. Writing connotes control.  In this respect 
he  coincides  with  Max  Weber.  Bureaucracy,  as  the  dominant  form  of 
power  in  modernity,  is  mainly  ‘aktengestützt’,  secured  by  files,  it  is  a 
writing  of  events  for  the  puprose  of  being  registered,  regulated,  and 
ultimately:  governed.  Digital  media,  as  a  generalized  form  of  writing 
including grammatized sound and image (Kittler 1986). The ubiquity of 
digital media is also the ubiquity of  writing,  the medium of philosophy 
and, as Weber reminds us, of bureaucracy. The measuring and valuing of 
all  areas  and  proceedings  of  public  and  private  services  in  our  ‘audit 
culture’ (Power 1997), a special mode of control by writing, which also 
deploys practices of measurement and calculation and thereby control in 
individual lives (Traue 2010b). The regulation by  control  is no longer  a 
normative  regulation  of  conduct,  but  one  afforded  by  the  standards  of 
protocol (Galloway 2004), e .g. the criteria  of assessment exercises,  the 
templates  of  social  software  profiles  or  the  technological  infrastrucure 
itself.
This raises the question: Is not every kind of self-care already self-control? 
Speaking simply: yes, of course. It is the constraint on my action which 
the other  exercises.  But who is this other and what are the devices  the 
other deploys in order to constrain my action, and how do I appropriate 
these devices in order to achieve agency myself? Writing and reading are 
perhaps the most important cultural techniques of control, which exhibit 
the interplay between agency and restraint: only if the individual learns to 
restrain itself in order to read and write can it transcend the situative pulls 
and pushes of the situation. But then there is also the kind of meta-control 
which  literacy,  or  rather,  the  process  of  becoming  literate  exerts,  in 
conjunction  with  hegemonial  knowledge;  this  is  the  kind  of  control 
Althusser  has  famously  called  the  effect  of  ‘ideological  state 
apparatusses’.
I  will  argue  that  the  problem  of  self-care  is  essentially  one  of  the 
ambiguity of  writing as  intersubjective practice relieved from everyday 
pressures, (or ‘skhole’, to use Bourdieu’s term) on the one hand, and as 
government on the other. Care is a prerequisite, a medium of individuation 
and  socialization,  but  it  can  be  functionalized,  by  replacing  it  with 
techniques of care-lessness manufactured in the cultural industries, or by 
individualising  it  in  practices  of  governing  and  thus  stripping  it  of  its 
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intersubjective  dimensions.  But  self-care  and  parrhesia,  as  the  most 
eminent mode of care of the other, is never outside of language, is never 
purely  event,  or  if  we  assumed  it  were,  we  would  draw  closer  to  a 
discourse such as that of Emmanuel Levinas,8 which has, in this case, the 
disadvantage of not lending itself to a sociological analysis of linguistic 
and societal institutions in the midst of a media rupture.  
Foucault does not ignore the issue of writing in regard to the care of the  
self: he states an irreducible relation between  regimes of “veridiction” 9 
and self-care: 
I  want  to  pose  [the  question  concerning  the  relation  between 
veridiction and the governing of the subject] in regard to the form 
and in the frame of the constitution of a relation to oneself, in order 
to demonstrate, how in this relation to oneself  a certain type of 
self-experience evolved which I find characteristic for occidental 
experience, for the occidental experience of oneself, but also for 
the occidental experience, which the subject can have or make up 
of the others (Foucault 2004: 289, my translation). 
The orders  of  knowledge  which  are  established in  a  certain  society  or 
polity, then, guide our experience, and that of us and of others. Foucault is 
not explicitly concerned with extending his analyses to the present, but he 
gives examples which lend themselves to such an extension: In antique 
ascetic  and  gymnastic  practices,  he  finds  the  form  of  lists,  or  rather: 
double lists of things which are useful or useless to know (Foucault 2004: 
292).  These lists  serve as a  programmatic guideline for  the exercise of 
8 Levinas  characterises  the  relation  to  the  other  as  being  related  to  in  the  
‚accusative’, as in the grammatical mode.  
9 The term is defined, apart from paragraphs in the Lecture on the ‚Hermeneutic of  
the Subject’ which I will refer to later, in two Texts: M. Foucault (2001): Dits et 
Ecrits, Nr. 278, and  Nr. 345, where veridiction is defined as follows: „In summary, 
the critical history of thought is neither a history of the progress of knowledge nor 
of a clouding of knowledge; it is the history of the emergence of games of truth: it  
is  the  history  of  „veridictions“,  understood  as  the  forms  according  to  which, 
regarding to  a  specific  domain of  objects,  discourses  are  articulated which are 
susceptible  to  being  true  or  false  speech:  which  were  the  conditions  of  this 
emergence, which was the price which has in a certain manner been paid for it,  
which are its effects on the real and the manner in which, by linking a certain type 
of object to certain modalities of the subject, it has constituted, for a duration, a 
space  and  the  individuals  endowed  with  the  historical  a  priori  of  a  possible 
experience“ [1451, my translation].  
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self-care;  one  should care  about  oneself  in  such  a  way that  the  useful 
knowledge  is  increased,  and  the  useless  knowledge  is  left  aside.  The 
experience of individuals is then such is the underlying hypothesis, shaped 
by  this  knowledge-based  privileging  of  certain  objects  and  modes  of 
knowing. Self-care, we can conclude, requires the application of regimes 
of verdiction to one’s lifestyles, including of course labor relations, family 
life,  political  life,  and  communal  life.  But  Foucault’s  treatment  of  the 
relation between veridiction as an institutionalized system of writing and 
care  remains  cursory,  even  though  he  makes  some  programmatic 
comments about it  in his  1983 article “Ecriture de soi” (Writing of  the 
Self),  where  he asserts  that  writing  means “showing oneself”,  “making 
appear” one’s own face before another’s (Foucault 2001:1244). Writing, in 
practices of care and self-care, especially in practices of correspondence, 
does not serve to decipher the self,  generate knowledge about it, but to 
open oneself toward the other. But how these writing practices, as element 
of the practice of friendship or counseling, are related to the  regimes  of 
veridiction is largely ignored in Foucault’s work.10 
Today’s regimes of veridiction are increasingly based on digital writing, 
and thus, I will argue, on media of control in a Deleuzian sense (Deleuze 
1992). The remainder of the article will be devoted to spelling out some of 
the consequences of this for self-care in contemporary societies. 
Control is, regarding the semantic and material origin of the term, founded 
in  the  knowledge  of  cybernetics  and,  regarding  its  material  basis,  in 
‘informatics’, or computer technology. Cybernetics emerges in the 1940s 
as  an  interdisciplinary  scientific  and  engineerial  discipline.  The 
cooperation between mathematicians,  biologists,  engineers,  sociologists, 
psychologists,  and  members  of  other  disciplines  who  meet  during  the 
famous  Macy  conferences  yields  a  rearticulation  of  anthropology:  the 
difference between the organism and the machine is flattened in the theory 
of feedback and self-organization.  
Cybernetics  had  from  the  1970s  onward  spread  into  a  number  of 
practitioner’s  fields,  including  therapy  (Traue  2010b).  The  German 
historian of cybernetics Stefan Rieger holds that it is the appreciation of 
the moving image which organizes  the discourse and the techniques of 
cybernetics. Cybernetics is about “Bewegungsbildsteuerung”, i. e. control 
of the moving image, mental and videotechnological. Rieger demonstrates 




that the projection of action into the future by organisms is conceived to be 
guided by images. At the same time, cyberneticians developed technical 
implementations for  machines  ´which store,  compute and transmit  data 
including image and sound. This notion of life migrated into therapeutics 
in the 1970s and ten years later into the professional world of corporate 
therapy (Traue 2010b). These are finding based on a discourse analysis of 
therapy  manuals  from  the  late  1800s  to  the  late  20th century  and  on 
interviews with coaches and other corporate and alternative therapists. In 
recent  practices  of  therapy  and  counseling  deriving  from  ‘cybernetic 
therapeutics’  hermeneutic  and  narrative  confessional  practices  are 
supplemented or replaced by practices of visualisation and the seeking and 
controlling of ‘feedback’ in the sense of approval and commentary. The 
cybernetic,  enterprising,  and  visual  technologies  model  the  self  by 
‘imitations’ of  memory  and  intersubjectivity  by  digital  and  audiovisual 
media. As self-relations mediated by ‘interpassivity’, i.e. the reliance on 
the presence of media, they allow for post-institutional (with Harraway: 
cyborgian) types of self-reliance – whether they constitute forms of care or 
carelessness needs to be discussed.  One explanation for  this  is  that  the 
subject position accorded to the cybernetic self is one of an observer, of 
somebody watching himself perform under the eyes of video-technologies 
(including  the  video-technologically  trained  human  eye).  The  media 
historian Bernard Siegert states: 
It is not a matter of man disappearing but of having to define, in 
the wake of the epistemic ruptures brought about by first- and 
second-order  cybernetics,  noise  and  message  relative  to  the 
unstable position of an observer (Siegert 2006: 43).
I want to argue that  control, not in the everyday sense of surveillance or 
domination, but in a Deleuzian and Eliasian sense, since Elias has a notion 
of control loops, is the extension of mastery of nature to mastery of the 
living by installing loops of measurement and visibility, rendering the life  
processes of life visible to the living itself. Control is thus more closely 
related to self-care than simpler grammatical forms of domination, such as 
codified  rules,  since  it  can  register  and  modulate  the  rhythms  of  life 
processes, the ontological difference between care and control being that 
control has its purpose in the stabilisation of processes, whereas self-care 
finds  its  purpose  in  a  transformation  of  processes.  But  control  as  the 
guidance of the living through apparatusses and media of registration and 
modulation  has  become  a  constitutive  structure  of  contemporary 
socialisation and individuation: 
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The subject presents itself, and it documents itself  as itself,  a structural 
condition  of  contemporary  subjectivity  the  German  sociologist  Hubert 
Knoblauch has called “double subjectivation”  (Knoblauch 2009).  It  not 
only presents itself to others within in social spaces; but it presents itself 
within  the  media  deployed  for  this  presentation,  being  aware  of  the 
constructive  nature  of  these  media.  Far  from  displaying  any  naive  or 
natural  social  behaviour,  it  engages with its  representations of itself by 
invoking,  utilizing  and  sometimes  withdrawing  from  the  regimes  of 
visibilities and veridiction. 
In  the  dispositifs  of  consulting  and  coaching,  and  more  general,  in 
postfordist regimes of labour, a double moment of knowledge generation 
installs  itself:  it  allows the individual  to be  seen and at  the same time 
prompts it to present and document itself. This presentation of self and its 
traces in writing (in cv’s, work biographies, ‚partnership biographies’ etc.) 
are visible to emotionally relevant others, gatekeepers and often even a 
general public. The more this structure of communication and visibility is 
looped,  i.e.  its  results  being ‚fed back’ to  the individual ego,  the  more 
operations on oneself a person is prompted to perform. Yet, of course, the 
more of an everyday quality the attainment of knowledge about oneself 
attains, the more areas of life it will encompass.
The lifestyles of individuals and the writing systems of feedback structures 
adapt to each other: bodies, territories, identities and actions are captured 
and fixed in writing at an ever higher temporal and spatial resolution. The 
subject does not remain blind to these intensifications of data streams, but 
contrarily develops skills of adapting itself to this condition. 
Conclusion: Self-care and systems of care in 
contemporary ‘governmediality’ 
Following Foucault’s discussion of self-care and parrhesia, I argued for a 
reading of self-care as event. It has become apparent that the ambiguity at 
the heart of the discourse on  narcissism  has become accessible through 
Foucault’s discussion of the notion of cura sui, care of the self. The event 
of self-care cannot be planned or controlled, but it is necessary conditions 
for individuation and thus the adaptation of societies to their technological 
and ethical challenges. The tendency of self-care to recede into narcissism 
is disturbed by the rupture which parrhesia, truth-telling, introduces into 
these practices. Parrhesia, however, is a precarious option in modernised 
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societies:  the  seat  of  power  is  in  a  certain  sense  vacant  in  advanced 
technological  societies,  since  the  politics  of  „there  is  no  alternative” 
(Margaret  Thatcher’s  famous  catchphrase)  depersonalises  and  de-
systematises power. Speaking the truth today has always to consider the 
forms in which any hypothetical truth said can escape its being disarmed 
in the spectacle of opinions and discourses.
The predominance of digital media – which inform communicative action 
and shape subjectivation processes in contemporary societies – intensifies 
communications which are necessary for practices of self-care. But these 
same media limit the possibilities of care by establishing subject positions 
of observation and self-observation. These subject positions are dispersed 
and installed via therapeutic practices and the strategies of mass media.  
Such  a  diagnosis  should  not,  however,  neglect  that  the  increased 
performativity of automedial practices, i.e. the presentation of oneself as a 
performing  body,  allows  for  and  provokes  mistakes,  failures  and 
breakdowns of prescribed and normative modes of representation.  What 
does  the  informatisation  and  visualisation  of  the  self  in  digital  culture 
imply for the ‘impossible possibility’ of self-care?
I argued that the care of the self is inherently a mode of letting oneself be 
observed by others, and that this observation can be coupled to systems of 
control such as evaluation regimes and regimes of writing the self.  The 
qualitative difference between ‘caring control’ and ‘cybernetic control’ is 
that  care  (in  the  sense  of  cura  sui)  is  retroactive;  it  occurs  as  a 
reinforcement  or  criticism  of  action  after  it  has  happened.  Cybernetic 
control is pro-active;  it  attempts to determine or influence behaviour of 
populations in advance. The media ruptures and social changes of the late 
20th century have changed the terrain for the constitution of the subject. 
Drawing from the technologies of control mentioned, there are three main 
ambivalences surrounding the question of the conditions of self-care in a 
substantial sense laid out by Foucault:
Firstly, we can observe a proliferation of techniques of imagining personal 
futures and communicating them to others: creativity techniques, project 
work and therapy are examples for these techniques of vision. But these 
futures  are  often  short-sighted  and  lack  a  foundation  in  experience, 
especially  the  historical  experience  afforded  by  intergenerational 
processes.  
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Secondly,  individuals  are  offered  increased  possibilities  for  presenting, 
documenting, and writing themselves. Media theorist Christoph Engemann 
and refer to this governing by providing writing media ‘governmediality’ 
(Engemann  2010,  Traue  2010a).  Certain  classes  have  certainly  been 
‘writing  themselves’ since  the  beginning  of  Bourgeois  society  and  in 
conjunction with cultural  movements as romanticism. But contemporary 
digital self-writing is available to almost all classes (in the global North), 
and  it  occurs  largely  in  the  context  of  pre-fabricated  protocols  which 
personnel  management,  e-government  and  marketing  provide.  The 
programme  industries  have  thus  successfully  wrested  control  over  a 
significant share of self-writing from the programme institutions (such as 
schools and universities). Yet, the state remains an important provider of 
authentication media such as passports, certificates and digital signatures 
(Engemann 2010).  Thirdly,  in  cognitive  capitalism,  individuals  feel  the 
desire  to  be  vital  and  expressive.  Subjects  thus  develop  “passionate 
attachments”  (Butler  1997)  to  the  symbolisations  of  expressivity  and 
vitality, even if they traumatise the subject which is unable to live up to the 
standards  of  vitality  and  creativity. In  conjunction  with  this  ‘cult  of 
creativity’ is  an  attachment  to  the  quasi-caring  of  service  work.  The 
‘entreployee’ is  less  concerned  with the  exploitation of  his  labor force 
because his or her labor always has a strong use-value component, when 
dealing with customers or co-workers. In a certain sense, care for others 
and  oneself  is  a  structural  element  of  post-fordistic  service  economies, 
only that care is constantly subordinated to performance. 
How  can  contemporary  society  process  these  contradictions  and 
ambivalences?  Of  course,  there  is  in  most  critical  academic  writing  a 
certain  sense  of  pessimism–which  is  entirely  justified.  The  German 
sociologist  Ulrich  Bröckling  (2007)  attempts  to  identify  lines  of  flight 
from  the  imperatives  of  the  enterprising  self;  he  comes  up  with  three 
strategies:  ‘depression’,  ‘ironicism’,  and  ‘passive  resistance’.  These  are 
strategies  of  temporary  and  partial  withdrawal  from  deregulated, 
individualized  labor  and  dispositifs  of  electronic  government.  But  they 
hardly offer  any social  or  political  perspective for a  democratisation of 
control and an autonomising culture of care and self-care, as he concedes. 
The difficulty is, in his words, to be “different differently” in the context 
of a capitalistic culture in which “being different” is a central requisite of 
innovation.
Bernard Stiegler offers an other, carefully optimistic outlook, based on an 
analysis  of  the relationship  between consciousness and Technology.  He 
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understands  media  as  ‘pharmakon’,  as  remedy  and  poison:  “Thus,  a 
pharmacological  analysis11 is  required  to  elaborate  a  therapeutic 
prescription — a system of care, i.e. a social and economic organization 
deriving from a political decision. But to the contrary, as anticipated by 
Antonio  Gramsci,  the  cultural  hegemony,  while  making  believe  that 
political decisions are no longer possible — “there is no alternative” — 
because politics has been absorbed by the market and the economy. This 
happens  precisely  through  psycho-power  subordinating  the  time  of 
available brains to the pure law of merchandise. But Gramsci’s concept is 
not sufficient for imagining either grammatization or its pharmacological 
dimension,  or  the  therapeutics  of  which  a  new  politics  should  exist” 
(Stiegler 2009: 47). For him, the question is “how the discretization  [i.e. 
the digitalisation of communication, B.T.] can be curative” and which the 
political, cultural and industrial conditions of such a care are (ibid: 48). 
The discretisation of communication afforded by cybernetic technologies, 
with  its  increasing  delegation  of  agency to  lay  actors  may replace  the 
exhausted Fordist model of labour and consumerism — if the technologies 
are  appropriated  with a  vision  of  solidarity  which  can do  without  pre-
established collectives of interest and without a common enemy (such as a 
cultural industry with its normalizing interpellations and its installations of 
interpassivity).  It  is up for us to fight for systems of care and self-care 
which  avoid  being  functionalised  in  contexts  of  ‘activating’  labour 
policies, which resist the transformation into means of social distinction, 
and which allow the formation of personal and political relations mediated 
by new technologies  out  of  which  we can create  new agencies.  These 
‘systems of care’–such as schools, inner-city neighborhoods, families, and 
social movements–are ‘technologies of the we’ which allow the distinction 
between  I,  you  and  we  to  be  rearticulated  continually,  avoiding  the 
disorientations of narcissism.
11 By “pharmacological”, Stiegler refers to Derrida’s usage of the term, who refers 
to pharmacon — following the etymology — as both poison and cure. In Derrida’s 
interpretation of Platon, writing is the pharmacon, whereas Stiegler generalises the 
term to technologies and techniques in general. 
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